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Abstract 
Why has ‘development aid’ been donated by so-called developed to under-developed 
populations since World War II? Using discourse analysis, this article provides partial 
answers to this riddle. First, we suggest that donor motives may be rooted in an 
ideology of ‘being good’ which, paradoxically, motivates recipients to be helpless, i.e. a 
Samaritan’s Dilemma. Second, drawing on journal articles from 1960-1970, we test this 
theory by tracing a global development discourse and ‘goodness ideology’ in a Western 
country like Denmark – a process that was strongly influenced by the agricultural co-
operative movement, which sought to export the ‘Danish cooperative model’. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Development research abounds with mainstream macroeconomic studies. They tend to 
focus on how political-economic instruments may enhance economic growth in less 
developed countries.1 Albert Hirschman and William Easterly are among the few 
economists to provide (quasi)cultural-ideological explanations of the shortcomings of 
international development aid programmes.2 
 Early on, Hirschman cautioned against giving grants to “aid-hungry governments” 
that would not have implemented the wanted policies (e.g. economic reforms) if aid had 
not been given. Such aid would involve high “hidden costs” and perhaps even nurture 
‘recipient cultures’ consisting of unreliable politicians and unsustainable economies.3 
Similarly, Easterly argued that failure most often is due to lack of incentives among “the 
 
1 See World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); C. Burnside and D. Dollar, ‘Aid, policies and growth’, Policy Research Paper, 1777 (World 
Bank, 1997); S.M.N. Islam, Optimal Growth Economics: An Investigation of the Contemporary Issues 
and the Prospect for Sustainable Growth (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2001); H. White, ‘The 
macroeconomic impact of development aid: A critical survey’, Journal of Development Studies, 28, 2 
(1992), 163-240; T. Ovaska, ‘The failure of development aid’, Cato Journal, 23, 2 (2003), 175-88. In 
recent years, the economic freedom factor has also played an increasing role; see e.g. J. Haan, and J-E. 
Sturm, “On the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth.” Working paper 1999/3. 
University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research. (1999); J.H. Cole, “The contribution of 
economic freedom to world economic growth 1980-99”, Cato Journal, vol. 23, no. 2: 46-57 (2003). 
2 W. Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2001); W. Easterly, “Why doesn’t aid work”. Cato unbound, April 3, 2006: 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/04/03/william-easterly/why-doesnt-aid-work (2006a; date of access: 
12 November 2006). 
3 AO. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971), p. 205-7. 
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players of the development game”.4 This includes lack of consensus among rivaling 
groups in recipient countries to promote overall economic growth at the national level. 
 Easterly’s critique of the inefficiency of development aid is further developed in 
his recent book, where he suggests that aid might even be harmful:  
 
“The West’s efforts to aid the Rest have been even less successful at goals 
such as promoting rapid economic growth, changes in government 
economic policy to facilitate markets, or promotion of honest and 
democratic government. The evidence is stark: $568 billion spent on aid to 
Africa, and yet the typical African country no richer today than 40 years 
ago. Dozens of “structural adjustment” loans (...) made to Africa, the former 
Soviet Union, and Latin America, only to see the failure of both policy 
reform and economic growth. The evidence suggests that aid results in less 
democratic and honest government, not more”.5 
 
 This pessimism may be exaggerated and Easterly and most others do not deny that 
individual development aid projects may have significant positive effects. Nevertheless, 
Easterly presents what may be termed the development aid puzzle: Why have 
Development Assistance Committee members (DAC-countries) continued to pour 
billions of dollars into poor countries over the last 60 years despite evident failure? Do 
we have a Samaritan’s Dilemma on our hands? Or has implementation simply failed? 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Table 1 shows that this substantial money flow has not decreased, rather to the 
contrary. Whether we include all receipts as in the table (official development 
assistance, private donors, debt relief, etc.) or use official development assistance 
(ODA) alone, 2005 was a record year. And nothing indicates that this tendency will stop 
in the near future.6 
In the literature three motives have been stressed: altruism, political ideology 
(pro- or anti-Communism) and national self-interest.7 Certainly, for powerful global 
actors such as the US, France and Japan, political, military and economic (trade) 
interests might seen as primary motives. ‘Non-altruism’ is arguably part of the 
explanation, especially from the policy-maker perspective. 
However, we here want to emphasise that this major reallocation of resources, 
which escalated during the 1960s, was fully voluntary, i.e. no threats of violence and nor 
even demands by recipient countries. Note also that until today these often risky 
investments have widespread support among tax-payers in donor countries – citizens 
who choose to donate money to strangers living thousands of miles away and, 
moreover, accept very poor control over how this money is spent. Therefore, we suggest 
an ideology matters approach to explain the aid riddle, a ‘goodness ideology’ that can 
 
4 W. Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill 
and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006b), p. 289. 
5 Easterly (2006a), p. 1. 
6 See Finfacts Team, ‘OECD says Development Aid flows top $100 billion in 2005’ (2006): 
http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article10005427.shtml (Date of access: 8 May 
007). 
7 For an overview, see J. Schraeder, S.W. Hook and B. Taylor, ‘Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A 
comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows’, World Politics, 50, 2 (1998), 294-
323. 
  
3 
 
be traced back to the 1948 UN Human Rights declaration.8 We do not suggest that this 
specific altruistic ideology – or ‘goodness ideology’ – prevailed in all donor countries. 
Historical sources, however, strongly suggest that in Scandinavian countries like 
Denmark, this factor more than anything triggered development aid in the pioneering 
period from the early 1950s to about 1970, rather than political or economic concerns or 
abstract altruism. 
 
 
Development discourse 
 
By focusing on development aid as an outcome of altruistic ideology on the part of 
donor-citizens we hope to fill a gap in existing literature. There is a lack of thorough 
historical analyses that consider such ideological and discoursive elements within a 
framework of adequate social science theory. There are examples of detailed, archive-
based historical accounts, e.g. in a recent special issue of Contemporary European 
History entitled “Europe and the first development decade”.9 But theoretical 
frameworks are often poorly developed or simply absent. 
 Many modernisation theorists distinguish between poor (underdeveloped) and 
rich (developed) societies, suggesting that economic development proceeds along a 
straight unambiguous line.10 The ‘naturalness’ of such phenomena has been strongly 
questioned by Arturo Escobar, who convincingly argues that development as a 
discourse was constructed by post-war development policy-makers in the US and 
Europe.11 Over a few years, this discourse became so strong that a space was created in 
which only certain things could be said (by both those for and those against current 
development strategies). It strongly contributed to legitimating the voices of Western 
‘experts’. Overall, Gilman views modernisation theory as high-concept version of 
Americanism, implying materialism without class conflict, secularism without 
irreverence and democracy without disobedience. Along the same line, Rist argues that 
underdeveloped peoples were now forced to travel the ‘development path’ mapped out 
for them by others. Stoler and Cooper relate this discourse of development to colonial 
encounters and ‘civilizing missions.’12 
Development discourse is of considerable interest to scholars from a number of 
disciplines (history, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, agriculture). 
Still, social constructivist inspired perspectives on development aid as an ‘invented’ or 
‘constructed’ relation between rich and poor countries are scarce. This is partly due to 
 
8 In particular in Article 22, which states that: ”Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international co-operation (..) of the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and free development of his 
personality”, cited from UN, ‘Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’: 
http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm (Date of access: 8 May 2007). Space does not permit further 
exploration of the relation between large-scale development aid and the HR declaration. 
9 H.I. Schmidt and H. Pharo, “Introduction”. Contemporary European History (Special issue, “Europe 
and the First Development Decade. The Foreign Economic Assistance Policy of European Donor 
Countries, 1958-1972”), vol. 12, no. 4: 387-394, p. 387 (2003). 
10 M.E. Latham, Modernisation as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the 
Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
11 A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press (1995). 
12 N. Gilman, Imposing modernity: Modernisation theory and Cold War America. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press (2003); Rist, G., The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global 
Faith, London (1997); Stoler, A.L. and F. Cooper, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois 
World. University of California Press (1997). 
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an often one-sided, a-historical, unreflective and ethnocentric focus on economic 
growth parameters. New perspectives, we argue, tell other stories than the traditional 
ones, adding new pieces to the development aid puzzle. 
 Therefore, we want to combine an anthropological-historical approach based on 
extensive empirical studies of Danish development aid 1950-1970 with a political 
economy approach (Samaritan’s Dilemma), in order to elucidate the ‘goodness 
ideology’ established during this period. Furthermore, we will focus on the 
development aid campaign within the influential Danish Co-operative Movement, using 
as historical sources the many rural journals and magazines from the period. We have 
scrutinized every issue of four influential journals to map out and analyse how a 
specific development aid discourse was formed step by step – influenced by local and 
global actors. These four journals, whose readership was primarily rural dwellers, are 
The Co-operative Magazine (Andelsbladet), Danish Youth (Dansk Ungdom, a magazine 
occupied with cultural issues), Weekly Magazine for Farmers (Ugeskrift for 
Landmænd), and Journal of Agricultural Economics (Tidsskrift for Landøkonomi). The 
most influential of these was the weekly The Co-operative Magazine issued by the 
Central Co-operative Committee in Denmark. That is one reason why articles from this 
magazine are used as main sources in the following. We were informed by a former 
editorial assistant that it was by far the most widely read agricultural magazine during 
the decade; in the mid-1960s circulation was about 20.000 copies. According to this 
editorial assistant, and somewhat surprisingly to us, this was mainly because it had 
exclusive rights to publish weekly quoted prices on agricultural products (!).13 
 This rather narrow empirical study provides some important insights into the 
ideological climate in a Western country during a period where development aid to so-
called ‘under-developed’ populations suddenly exploded. Thus, we hope that our case 
study will have much wider implications than the specific Danish context by showing 
how the twentieth century goodness ideology was discursively constructed by use of 
nineteenth century evolutionist theory, and how it was to lay the moral foundation for 
large-scale development aid from the West to the Rest after World War II.14 
 More specifically, our thesis is that the West European discussions on 
’development’ may be derived from the evolutionary line of thought within the social 
sciences. Darwin’s survival theory in The Origin of the Species (1859) was adopted as 
the main principle for understanding the development of civilisation. Other early 
examples are Edward Tylor’s history of institutions, Herbert Spencer’s history of 
progress and the attempts by Lewis Morgan and Friedrich Engels to trace the origins of 
the family.15 
 In these macro interpretations of human history, the Latin word ‘development’ 
 
13 Interview 8 May 2007 with former editorial assistant Tove Sølvsteen. When the last volume (vol. 106) 
of Andelsbladet was published in 2005, circulation was at the lowest level in all years, 6,700 copies. 
Circulation was not reported in the 1960s volumes, making the interview necessary. That also holds for 
the three other publications. However, we know that their circulations were significantly lower, probably 
no more than 5000. 
14 This is an interesting example of what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu termed a theorisation effect, 
a symbolic practice that contributes to shape reality – just like Marxian terms such as ‘the class struggle’ 
did. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 178; The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 134. 
15 E.B. Tylor, Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, 
language, art and customs, New York: Henry Holt (1871); H. Spencer, The Study of Sociology. Henry S. 
King, London (1873); L.H. Morgan, Ancient Society, London: Macmillan (1877); F. Engels, The Origin 
of the Family, Private Property and the State, 4th edition, London: Lawrence & Wishart (1884).(See also 
P. Hirst, Social Evolution and Sociological Categories. Controversies in Sociology. Series 5. London: 
Allen & Unwin 1976.)). 
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(orig. from French développer, ‘to unwrap’, derived from Latin develare, ‘to reveal’) 
assumed a particular normative significance, dividing the populations of the world into 
two halves: The successful and the less successful. Or put otherwise, ‘development’ as 
literally revealing population groups as being at various stages of development 
according to the ladder metaphor. 
 Empirically, social-evolutionist theories were confirmed by case studies of 
‘primitive societies’ at the first stages of development. Thus, distances in space came to 
equalise distances in developmental stages (rungs on a ladder), and it gradually became 
a widely held notion to view history as a ‘Global development race’ between cultures 
and nations – no matter if the purpose of this development was seen as the communist 
society, capitalism or technological perfection. 
 In fact, Western scientists were quite successful in promoting the idea of history 
as an evolutionary and teleological process; perhaps they still are. They posited that in 
the race of cultures in space there are ‘speedy’ and highly developed cultures or nations 
as well as slow and backward ones. Hence, this line of thought was adopted not only by 
Western populations but, also by the so-called ‘primitive’ or ‘backward’ peoples 
themselves – cf. Escobar’s observations.16 In a similar approach, and much in line with 
Stoler and Cooper, anthropologist Johannes Fabian17 termed this phenomenon 
allochronic discourses. That is, Western scientific discourses placing non-Western 
peoples and cultures in other (previous) times, thereby constructing them as less 
developed than the peoples and cultures to which the scientists themselves belonged. 
Thus science, or more specifically, ethnography helped create “an allochronic discourse 
according to which the other never occupies the same historical time as the Western 
observer”. In this way, non-Western countries became Third World countries.18 Such 
equalisations of time and space also show up in other anthropological case studies, most 
famously in Edward Said’s seminal book Orientalism.19 
 Our Danish case study shows that the evolutionist ideas of the nineteenth century 
were adopted in agricultural circles in Western countries, not least after World War II. 
At that time, evolutionist terminology was transformed into an abstract and academic 
development terminology comprising a whole ‘family’ of powerful concepts. At the 
core of this ‘allochronic’ discourse was The Development, sometimes further specified 
(albeit no less abstractly) as The Structural Changes, The Centralisation or The 
Globalisation, always implying a risk of cultural stagnation. Such terminology not only 
encouraged an imperative to change the mode of agricultural production. In a dual 
movement it also became an imperative to help less developed countries in the global 
development race. 
 In the following, we will trace the development discourse in Denmark 1960-1970, 
mainly by shedding light on the development aid discourse in the important and world-
famous Danish cooperative movement. Due to a strong ambition to export the 
successful ‘Danish cooperative model’ to developing countries, this movement had a 
major impact on state-sponsored development aid during this period, not least on 
technical development aid. First, we present the theoretical framework – the assumption 
of a Samaritan’s Dilemma – in the context of global development aid. Then we trace the 
formation of a development discourse in Denmark based on what we term a goodness 
 
16 A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press (1995). 
17 J. Fabian, Time and the Other. How Anthropology makes its Object. Columbia University Press, New 
York, (1983). 
18 Ibid., p. 143ff.. 
19 E.D. Said, Orientalism. Random House, Vintage Books. New York (1978). 
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ideology. To this end we use printed historical sources, mainly articles from rural, 
agricultural and cooperative journals and magazines 1960-1970 in what is known as the 
great era of development aid optimism in Denmark. Finally, we analyse whether Danish 
development aid is an illustration of the ‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’. 
 
 
The Samaritan’s Dilemma 
 
We hasten to stress that we do not doubt the best intentions of givers, nor do we 
question the necessity of cross-border solidarity and responsibility. We do, however, 
point to the problem of the ideology of being good in helping developing countries – 
hitherto simply called ‘primitive’ societies with no mitigating euphemisms. The often 
overlooked core problem of countries that apparently cannot make it on their own (and 
therefore become eligible for help without reciprocal repayment) is that it simply may 
pay for recipients to stay helpless. 
 In other words, and as argued by political economist James M. Buchanan in his 
seminal article “The Samaritan’s Dilemma”, a recipient profits from exploiting a donor 
or ‘Samaritan’, whose dominant strategy is being ‘good’.20 Nannestad says that while 
the motivations of the Samaritan are morally irreproachable, those of the recipient are 
not. Basically it is a model of exploitation of the “good” by the “not good”, made 
possible by the fact that being good is the Samaritan’s dominant strategy. Both players 
are rational, but have different priorities: being morally good, being materially better 
off. Cooperation can replace the dominant strategy only if the players share priorities.21 
 Buchanan considered increasing economic affluence as one possible explanation 
for the pervasive importance of what he called the Samaritan’s Dilemma in twentieth 
century Western society. Wealth makes it possible to choose ‘soft options’ such as 
“kindness to criminals.” Furthermore, this softness is strengthened by the ‘Puritan ethic’ 
where Christian love was ‘love of God,’ which was effectively translated into a set of 
precepts for personal behaviour.22 
 The dilemma arises from the ideology or dominant strategy of being good. Coate, 
for example, demonstrates how too much altruism may lead to unconditional transfers 
to the poor, who may then forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in 
the event of loss.23 Likewise, Dijkstra argues that in cases the recipient gets more 
money from the Samaritan, he will work less than the Samaritan would like him to. 
 
20 J.M. Buchanan, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma”, pp. 71-85 in E. Phelps (ed.) Altruism, Morality and 
Economic Theory, New York: Russel Sage (1975). See also P.T. Bauer, Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in 
the economics of development, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (1984); S. Coate, “Altruism, the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy”, American Economic Review, vol. 85, no. 1: 46-
57 (1995); D. Schmidtchen, “To help or not to help: The Samaritan’s dilemma revisited”. Discussion 
paper 9909, Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Saarland University (1999); K.R. Pedersen, 
“The Samaritan’s Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid.” International Tax and Public 
Finance 8: 693-703 (2001); B.R. Dijkstra, Samaritan versus Rotten Kid: Another Look. Working paper, 
University of Nottingham (2003). 
21 P. Nannestad, “Taxing the well-off or the less well-off? Why immigrants on the dole may be the 
optimal policy for rational egalitarians”. Draft. (2004). 
22 Vague threats or promises to cut off charity by a donor in the absence of work on the part of the 
recipient will remain empty unless there is a demonstrated willingness to carry out such threats. However, 
as Buchanan puts it: “…to carry these out, the Samaritan will, in actuality, suffer disutility which may be 
severe. He may find himself seriously injured by the necessity of watching the parasite starve himself 
while refusing work. Furthermore, even if the parasite works, the Samaritan suffers by his own inability 
to provide charity” Buchanan (1975: 76). 
23 Coate (1995). 
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Thus, the less money the recipient earns for himself, the more needy he becomes, and 
the more money he will get from the Samaritan. So, when the recipient moves first, he 
can extort more money from the Samaritan by working less.24 
 This ‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’ is also present in the case of development aid 
because donor countries cannot punish recipient countries by refusing to grant more aid 
because the result would be even more poverty in the short term. Thus, the recipient 
may be rewarded in economic terms for staying helpless.  
 Formulated in anthropological terms, the risk is that we end up with no equal and 
mutually obliging reciprocal relations, that is, we have unbalanced reciprocity.25 
Moreover, according to Bauer,26 what motivation should so-called ‘underdeveloped’, 
‘developing’ or ‘depending’ populations have to improve their life conditions to satisfy 
other people’s abstract ‘the development’ idea of what their future lives ought to be? Or 
is development aid in essence paid so that recipients accept enforced futures? 
 As is widely documented in classical anthropological and sociological literature,27 
balanced reciprocity, implying balanced power relationships, is only possible when the 
recipient is granted a realistic possibility to pay back – economically or otherwise – in 
near or far futures. In other words, there seems to be a break in reciprocity, leading to 
powerlessness, dependency and the temptation to stay helpless. Or as Bauer writes: 
‘being kept in that state’. Concrete personal relationships based on trust and social 
control seem to have been replaced by an abstract and impersonal donor relationship 
‘system’ without efficient sanction mechanisms. 
 Contributing to the alleviation of poverty in recipient countries is one of the main 
goals of most aid organisations. However, stripped of personal contact and thus, of 
identity, trust and social control, unbalanced reciprocity in the form of unidirectional 
monetary development aid may often seem economically unproductive – mechanisms, 
which have been observed even in ‘pure’ market exchanges.28 
 As pointed out by political scientist Elinor Ostrom, it is highly problematic to 
transfer visible capital (physical, economic, technological) or reified capital (human) to 
third world countries. Investment in an organisational framework that fosters invisible 
forms of capital such as social capital should be seen as equally as important as 
investments in physical capital. Ostrom concludes that “if external agents of change do 
not take into account the delicate balance of interests [among farmers] embedded in 
social capital when investments in physical capital are undertaken, efforts to improve 
productivity can have the opposite effect”.29 
  Such objections to post-war international development aid also occur in the 
economic and political science literature. Thus, Pedersen strongly questions whether 
foreign aid actually reduces poverty.30 Within development economics studies, we find 
 
24 Dijkstra (2003). 
25 E.g. Burt 1992. Originally developed by American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins in Stone Age 
Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Press, 1972): “The Spirit of the Gift,” pp. 149-183. 
26 P.T. Bauer, From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
(1984). 
27 E.g. G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. Free Press, New York ([1908] 1955); M. 
Mauss, The Gift. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London ([1925] 1969); K. Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time. Beacon Hill, Boston, MA (1944); 
Bourdieu 1977). 
28 Y. Ben-Porath, ”The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange”, 
Population and Development Review, vol. 6: 1-30 (1980). 
29 E. Ostrom, “Constituting social capital and collective action”. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 6, 4: 
527–62 (1994: 559). 
30 K.R. Pedersen, “The Samaritan’s Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid.” International 
Tax and Public Finance 8: 693-703 (2001). See also R. Cassen et al., Does Aid Work? Oxford: Clarendon 
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a school casting doubt on the usefulness of international development aid in its 
traditional forms, thus questioning the academic development aid optimism of the 1950s 
and 1960s.31 Here the surprising conclusion is that the result is often counterproductive, 
because long-term development aid may deepen poverty or further skew the relative 
income distribution.32 In short, we have a Samaritan’s Dilemma where the helpless 
remain helpless. 
 In the following, we use the case of Danish development aid 1960-1970 in order 
to shed light on the discourse and ideology of the global development race and its 
implicit goodness ideology. 
 
 
The Danish co-operative movement 
 
During the nineteenth century, a broad tradition of civic organisation was established in 
the Danish rural areas. From the beginning of the century, this organisation was driven 
by energetic entrepreneurs and institutionalized in the form of associations, so 
numerous in the last part of the century that the period came to be known as 
Foreningstiden, ‘the associations era’. 
 This new civic society in the Danish country-side emerged after a land reform in 
about 1800, which transformed a feudal economy into a capitalist free-market one. This 
motivated many new free-holders among formerly adscripted peasants to establish 
voluntary insurance associations to cover fire, cattle and health, simply to survive. 
During the last decades of the century, however, these networks were transformed into 
voluntary, cooperative associations that provided a range of collective goods as well in 
so-called ’cooperative villages’. This myriad of co-operative, democratically based 
associations was established by the peasants themselves, including wholesale societies 
from 1866, dairies from 1882, feedstuff purchase associations from 1883 and 
slaughterhouses from 1887 – to mention just the most important sectors. It is important 
to note that this close economic co-operation between Danish peasants and wealthy as 
well as poor farmers, also led to the formation of numerous cultural institutions during 
the second half of the century, community folk high schools, free-schools, village halls, 
etc. In this way a remarkable economic growth was set in motion alongside new cultural 
institutions that ultimately paved the way for a democratic take-over of political power 
by the peasants’ party in 1901.33   
 In the 1960s, however, the co-operative organisational form underwent 
fundamental changes. Previously parish based local associations were closed en masse 
due to organisational centralisation, to the regret of many farmers. How could this 
happen? Reading rural magazines and journals beginning after World War II and to 
about 1970 – both those concerned with cultural and with agricultural issues – suggests 
that at that time development was seen as a structural development by the Danish rural 
population. Furthermore, the word structure (from Lat. struere, ‘to construct’, ‘to 
build’) seems to imply that The development was a necessary and inevitable one, a kind 
of mandatory future – however unwanted and feared by the great majority of the 
 
Press (1994); Krueger et al., Aid and Development. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University 
Press (1989); Boone (1996); P.S. Jensen and M. Paldam, Can the new aid-growth models be replicated? 
Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Working Paper 2003-17 (2003). 
31 White (1992), p. 168ff. 
32 Pedersen (2001); Bauer (2000). 
33 For details see G.L.H. Svendsen and G.T. Svendsen, (2004) The Creation and Destruction of Social 
Capital: Entrepreneurship, Co-operative Movements and Institutions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2004). 
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population.34 However, the sources indicate that the Danes did not immediately give 
way to this new development terminology, including the rural population. Thus, articles 
in rural journals published around 1960 reveal that Danish farmers found it difficult to 
understand the amazing Latin words being propagated by agricultural economists and 
other experts. Moreover, our archive studies on two parish dairies show that farmers 
even had difficulty in pronouncing and spelling words such as ‘rationalisation’ and 
‘fusion’.35 Nonetheless, by the mid-1960s, over an amazingly short period of time, 
Danish farmers were becoming familiar with the new terminology. The import, 
internalisation and spread of a new ‘discourse of rurality’ on the initiative of a group of 
energetic and modernist-minded agricultural leaders and experts gradually affected 
common farmers. 36 
 In this way The structural changes – a term expressing external global market 
conditions and simultaneously implicitly promoting a modernist worldview – suddenly 
became reality for the rural population during the 1960s. With respect to empirical 
evidence, the structural changes were ‘proven’ by statistics, often referred to as ‘the talk 
of the numbers’ or, in sum, THE DEVELOPMENT. Nobody can resist The 
development, was the conclusion reached by a still larger group of resigned farmers. 
Hence, farmers gradually stopped questioning the modernist post-war development 
paradigm. In fact, in the 1960s open criticism of the leading defenders of ‘the law of 
development’ almost became unthinkable. The few dissenters who dared raise public 
critique of The rationalisation, The Centralisation and The structural development were 
seen as reactionaries by agriculturalist leaders and experts within the in agricultural 
circles near-hegemonic co-operative movement. 
 Explicit comparisons were made with developing countries where such 
reactionary elements also impeded progress and ‘natural development’, as it was often 
expressed. Some even argued that the Danish rural population – like that in America – 
lagged behind the more civilized urbanites, implying that the urban-rural relation was a 
direct reflection of that between developed and developing countries.37 
 In an article in a Danish agriculturalist journal in 1963, American agronomist 
Robert C. Cook addressed this issue with reference to the poor black farm-workers in 
the American  south: “With regard to income and upbringing, the rural population is 
typically far behind the urban population. This inherited difference threatens the rural 
youth now when our complicated and technological society demands more skills 
acquired through a more extended education”.38 
 
34 The Danish term strukturændringer is a direct translation of ‘structural changes’, corresponding to. the 
German word strukturwandel or the French changement structurel. It was imported from the US after 
World War II. Thus, search on article databases reveals that the concept was first developed in the late 
1930s in the American Economic Review. Alvin H. Hansen (1937: 131) wrote about ‘deep-seated 
structural changes in economic institutions’ after World War I in his paper “The Situation of Gold Today 
in Relation to World Currencies”. The American Review of Economics, vol. 27, no. 1: 130–40 (1937). In 
the same journal, Benjamin M. Anderson, Jr. (1940: 247) wrote about disturbances in global economy 
after 1929 due to ‘structural changes’ in the paper ”Governmental Economic Planning”. 
35 Cf. Svendsen and Svendsen (2004) 128-29. 
36 Of these modernist-thinking, new leaders and experts was Anders Andersen, who during the 1960s 
headed the Danish National Confederation of Agricultural Syndicates, was President of the Danish 
Agricultural Council and an MP; economist Poul Nyboe Andersen, chairman of The Danish Union of Co-
operative Wholesale Societies and of the Danish Agency for Promotion of Technical Cooperation with 
Developing Countries (1962-65); Johs. Dons Christensen, chairman of the Danish Co-operative 
Committee; Clemens Pedersen, editor of Andelsbladet during the period; professor Kjeld Philip, special 
consultant for The Danish Agency for Underdeveloped Countries on issues on agricultural co-operatives; 
and Torkil Mathiassen, head of the Danish Dairy Office. 
37 See Andelsbladet (Ab) 1963: 3. 
38 Ugeskrift for Landmænd (UfL) 1963: 733 (our translation). 
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 From the mid-1960s, the advocates of centralisation became increasingly 
impatient to realize their idea of only one cooperative dairy company, one cooperative 
wholesale society association, one co-operative slaughterhouse association, one co-
operative chemicals and feedstuff company, etc. At the same time, centralisation was 
recommended by experts in international organisations, for example the International 
Co-operative Alliance (ICA), which was strongly in favour of a unity movement run by 
highly educated specialists.39 
 Ideologically, the propaganda for full centralisation was rooted in the concept of a 
global development race. In this debate, influential arguments were that “other countries 
have overtaken Danish dairy production”, “the current methods of working are 
outdated”, “the Danish dairy industry must rationalise to keep its position among the 
leading countries”, “the dairy sector is lagging behind”.40 
 That the time-honoured Danish co-operative dairy stood to lag behind in the near 
future was a worrying argument for all Danes, farmers and urbanites alike. Often such 
bogeys in the rural journals and magazines were supplemented by photos of poor people 
and primitive dairies in developing countries like Africa and India.41 
 
[Fig. 1] 
 
 Thus, the dairy culture was considered a barometer indicating the degree of 
economic development, and the risk was that this sector would lose its position if it 
failed to rationalise production. The fear of involution and degeneration led to a general 
consensus among top leaders in the co-operative sectors that a full merger was the only 
option available to ensured survival under the ‘law of development’. To fail to obey this 
law was to (involuntarily!) go native, even to become primitive – in short, to descend 
the development ladder. 
 
 
Establishment of a goodness ideology in Denmark 
 
Evidently, the post-war development discourse in Denmark was not initiated 
domestically. As mentioned, the Latin terminology was imported from the US. 
Similarly, an altruistic ideology underpinning the new interest in development aid was 
imported, primarily from the UN institutions and Sweden. Thus, early on the article 
”Welfare state – welfare world” by Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal seemed to have 
had a major impact on the Scandinavian debate. The article, which was published in 
three sections in Andelsbladet from February to March 1961, was described by the 
editorial board as “a serious comment to the efforts to assist the underdeveloped 
countries”.42 
 Myrdal posited that the main problem was the nationalistic economic policies 
pursued by rich Western European countries, which acted as a barrier to international 
economic integration.43 In other words, the rich Western countries had strongly 
contributed to placing the underdeveloped countries in a vicious circle that prevented 
their industries from becoming competitive on the world market.44 These evident 
 
39 Ab (1965), pp. 1186, 1368. 
40 Ab (1962), pp. 113, 125, 303, 958; Ab (1963), p. 1045. 
41 Ab (1962), p. 958. 
42 Ab (1961), p. 159. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Op.cit., p. 187. 
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shortcomings in the world economy tended to reinforce nationalistic groupings in the 
impoverished countries to such an extent that governments of underdeveloped countries 
would raise aggressive and undue demands for compensation from the rich countries, by 
Myrdal termed “extortion politics”.45  
 Myrdal did not talk about Samaritan’s Dilemmas; he thought that the tension of 
economic exploitation and aggressive counter-reaction could only be solved through 
’The world revolution’. This revolution would wipe out poverty and clear the way to a 
global welfare society – a future strategy that was seen as “natural, necessary, correct 
[and which] moves in the direction of progress”.46 Such real progress would lead to “a 
democratic welfare world, which involves increased international solidarity both from 
the side of rich and poor countries, and increased international co-operation in order to 
give all people in the whole world the same possibilities (..) a world society [which] 
bases on equality and everybody’s taking fully part in power”.47 
 Thus, during the 1960s ordinary Danish farmers began to share with Myrdal and 
his Danish advocates a strong vision of a global social conscience, global justice and 
ultimately a global welfare society world with no bad guys, only good guys. This seems 
somewhat paradoxical, as these farmers only a few years previously had expressed 
scepticism about an ‘international solidarity’, which they associated with urban labour 
union mentality. Apart from journal articles such as letters to the editor, this ideological 
shift is also evident in a questionnaire survey carried out at the Annual Co-operative 
Wholesale Societies congress in 1966. To the question “Would you like to propose the 
members of your wholesale society to allocate 2 DKK of their annual dividends to the 
cooperative movements in the underdeveloped countries?” Two thirds of 316 delegates 
answered yes, while only the last third answered no (66 versus 34 per cent).48 
 In Andelsbladet, the development assistance campaign took the form of seminars, 
conferences and articles authored by experts and consultants within the movement. The 
articles were often illustrated with pictures of poor, primitive and (often) black people. 
Overall, the message was that more development assistance was needed. In the mid 
1960s typical headlines were: “Tragic riots must not weaken development aid from 
West”, “We have to contribute to international development aid”, “Work for 
underdeveloped countries is vital to us all”.49 
 On the part of the experts, Myrdal-inspired economist Poul Nyboe Andersen was 
among the most important advocates of development aid from Denmark generally, and 
from the co-operative movement specifically. 
 Like Myrdal, Nyboe Andersen wanted to enhance the economic independence of 
underdeveloped populations. This was to happen in a process of democratisation where 
the Danish contribution would be “to enter into a positive co-operation with the 
 
45  Op.cit, p. 189. 
46  Ab (1961), p. 219. 
47 Ab (1961), p. 189. Whether Myrdal’s economic analysis was correct or not, it seems evident that the 
implicit development theory it builds on was the idea of a global development race with equal 
participants. In contrast, the evolutionist ideas of Herbert Spencer and Edward Tylor were not 
development as biologically determined evolution, i.e. conditioned by the physical, mental, social and 
cultural environments of various human races – polygenesis – involving naturally conditioned 
qualifications among participants in the global development race. Myrdal’s vision is very similar to that 
of nineteenth century Christian English altruists, who emphasized the unity of human races in that every 
human being was created by the same God (Hirst 1976; H.E. Augstein, “Physical Anthropology: Natural 
Similarity”, Clio Medica, vol 52, no. 1: 57-104 (1999). In this monogenetic version, all races had the 
same opportunities to ascend the evolutionary ladder, because they were made of the same material – 
although lack of Christian enlightenment could act as a barrier.  
48 Ab (1966), p. 129. 
49 Ab (1965), p. 31; Ab (1965), p. 124; Ab (1966), p. 422. 
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developing countries through our help to them, and to give them knowledge of how we 
in the Western world have solved our societal problems”.50 Following Nyboe Andersen, 
a co-operative organisational form implemented in the poor countries was to act as help 
to self-help – just as the agricultural co-operative movement had done in nineteenth 
century rural Denmark.51  
 That a Danish/Scandinavian co-operative movement with rich democratic 
traditions would be able to contribute significantly to development in poor countries 
became a widespread assumption in Denmark in the early 1960s. For example, in the of 
the Freedom instead of Hunger campaign in spring 1964, Kjeld B. Juul, consultant in 
the organisation Danish Association for International Co-operation (Mellemfolkeligt 
Samvirke) and later on FAO, used the development rhetoric of the day when stating in 
an interview that he recognised “the Scandinavian countries to be the most enlightened 
in the world”. Furthermore, they ”should engage themselves in a large-scale co-
operative project, which they have the prerequisites to carry out”.52 
 This thinking was in line with the vision of the international co-operative 
movement as the most important element in development work and it was promoted by 
powerful international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), International Labour Organisation (ILO), The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and International Co-operative Association (ICA). 
However, even if they shared this vision, such organisations were often in mutual 
competition to implement the co-operative model in recipient countries – a fact widely 
documented in the Danish agricultural journals of the 1960s, not least Andelsbladet.53 
 Overall, the importance of international development aid organisations after 
World War II appears vast in Denmark, a Scandinavian welfare-society in the making. 
The historical sources clearly document that these aid organisations – most of them sub-
organisations under the umbrella organisation of the UN – put considerable pressure on 
national governments. For example, at the ILO conference in Geneva in 1966 a 
resolution was unanimously decided recommending all member states to promote co-
operative movements as “one of the most important means to economic, social and 
cultural development as well as human progress in the developing countries”.54 In 1966, 
such a recommendation was most often seen as a request, nurtured by bad conscience 
among former colonial-imperial Western populations. 
 
[Fig. 2] 
 
 We thereby understand why the idea of the Danish co-operative movement having 
a special mission in development work soon got full political support. According to 
Prime Minister Krag (1963), “There is no doubt that our co-operative movement can be 
transplanted to more primitive forms – and the co-operative principle appeals to the 
underdeveloped countries”.55 Likewise, foreign minister Hækkerup stated (1964) that a 
co-operative movement striking the golden mean between capitalism and communism, 
“beyond any doubt [has] great prospects in the underdeveloped countries”.56 
 The arguments used by protagonists of Danish development assistance can be 
parsed into three main strains, all sharing the underlying assumption of ‘the global 
 
50 Ab (1963), p. 1280. 
51 See also Svendsen and Svendsen 2004. 
52 Ab (1964), p. 688. 
53 E.g. Ab (1965), pp. 923, 1186, 1304; Ab (1966), p. 860; Ab (1968), p. 1128; Ab (1970), p. 70. 
54 Ab (1966), p. 860. 
55 Ab (1963), p. 60. 
56 Ab (1964), p. 511. 
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development race’. 
  First, major Danish development aid was grounded in sincere concern about 
’global disasters’ (world war, political instability, overpopulation, etc.), which Myrdal 
and other experts warned would be the natural consequence of the chronic imbalance in 
the world economy. However, this overall concern did not preclude self-interest in the 
form of cultivating future markets for Danish exports.57 Here the underdeveloped 
populations were seen as constituting a vast potential market.58 Finally, the third 
argument was moral duty to help people in need. Judging from the journal articles, this 
seemingly non-economic rationale for a Danish development aid appears to be the most 
important one, here labelled ‘goodness ideology’. 
 This purportedly civil (liberal) duty was also termed ’global social 
consciousness’, that is, a Christian-altruistic social consciousness ’extended’ to 
(primitive) populations living in other time-space dimensions. In a manifesto article by 
one of the most prominent leaders within the co-operative movement entitled “Think in 
time – let’s share our ’fortune’”, the Danish rural population learned that Danes had 
been too “slow” to help the underdeveloped countries. In order to change this, the best 
remedy would be “a national enlightenment work (…) that should make people more 
sympathetic towards the perspectives of the development aid” – an enlightenment work, 
which, it was stated, should aim to reach “the inner corners of secure Danish cosiness 
[hygge]”.59 The imperative go be good, or to do good (even in the face of meagre 
development aid results), is also reflected in many other statements. Typical assertions 
were that of professor Pihl, who announced in 1961 that “today, it is beyond dispute 
that development aid is (…) a civil duty”; or an Andelsbladet editorial from 1961 
arguing for the necessity of a “total change of our attitude towards underdeveloped 
peoples [an attitude, which previously] has been rooted in a mindset dating back to 
colonial times”.60 
 It is interesting to observe that in their efforts to legitimise such unilateral gift-
giving and national propaganda campaigns, the three key arguments were conflated – 
albeit always resting firmly on the moral imperative to help all people in need. Danish 
hesitation to grant even more money was according to Andelsbladet due to: ”a lack of 
understanding, not only of people in great need, but also of the dangers inherent in not 
sharing with others our affluent society, whether it be in the form of education, money 
or something else [or we will risk] a very dangerous tension between the “rich” 
Northern hemisphere and the “poor” Southern hemisphere”, etc. And finally, the typical 
’allochronic’ closing remark, which more than anything echoes the amazing decade of 
the 1960s: “Let us not come too late with our aid, because we did not think in time”.61 
 
 
The Danish Co-operative Movement and The white man’s burden 
 
The sources indicate that we should not underestimate the moral argument and the 
‘goodness ideology’ behind it. It is quite amazing that an otherwise conservative and 
 
57 For example, Nyboe Andersen stated in 1965 that: ”in the long run, a good contact to, and goodwill in, 
the developing countries may enhance Danish agricultural exports”. In a true altruistic spirit he hastened 
to add that primarily, “the economical, technical and social development within Danish agriculture during 
the last century contains elements of high value for the ongoing development in poor agricultural 
countries all over the world” (Ab 1965, p. 261). 
58 E.g. Ab (1965), pp. 78ff. 
59 Ab (1964), p. 510. 
60 Dansk Ungdom (DU) [Danish Youth] (1961), p. 150; Ab (1961), p. 210. 
61 Ibid. 
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local-oriented rural peasant population (the Danish word bonde, peasant, originally 
meant ‘settled’) in a couple of years became convinced of the necessity to help people 
in need across the globe. In this way, ‘the global social consciousness’ was adopted 
between 1960 and 1965 not only by urban Denmark – ever since, the ‘ideology of 
goodness’ has been an integral part of the Danish worldview and self-understanding, 
reflected in increased development aid from the Danish state, social science research 
and rapid growth in charity organisations, accompanied by various charity concerts and 
money collection drives – the effects of which can be highly doubted, to put it mildly.62 
 It is also interesting how closely the ideology of goodness is linked to the idea of 
a global development race – a time threat or lack of time used as the main engine for an 
‘industry’ of good deeds beyond personal contact. Based on that worldview, it was 
believed that Danish nineteenth century co-operative history would – or ought to – 
repeat itself in primitive ‘time lagged’ countries.  
 So, after World War II and especially in the first part of the 1960s the ‘extended 
social sense of responsibility’, which first appeared in Danish social legislation late in 
the nineteenth century in response to harsh economic liberalism, also came to include 
other nations in a post-colonial context. In short, it was a renaissance of what may be 
summarized as ‘the white man’s burden’.63 
 The white man’s burden implied a moral imperative, the purpose of which was to 
mitigate what the old Greeks called iriniyas (goddesses of revenge), who would justly 
cast their nemesis upon former colonial masters: The feeling was that we from the West 
had invoked the anger of God and therefore had to right the wrongs we had committed, 
for example through exports of money and technical assistance. “I believe”, as Danish 
foreign minister Hækkerup stated in 1964, “that we [Danes] generally have done too 
little for the underdeveloped countries”.64 His point was that Danes at that time had an 
extraordinary chance to ’help along’ (ophjælpe) the poor populations, as it was often 
expressed. That is, to help them speed up their climb up the development ladder, thus 
allowing them to approach the same high level as the Danes. “One has to remember”, 
Hækkerup continued, ”that the development necessarily has to proceed step by step, 
even though that the underdeveloped countries, assisted by the developed countries, can 
reach our technical and economic level in much shorter time than we have done 
ourselves”.65 
 Later that year, in December 1964, an editorial in Andelsbladet baldly stated that 
the real mission was to bring civilisation to the primitive populations in the 
underdeveloped countries, not least to ”dark Africa”. Here, the Danish co-operative 
movement was to contribute to bring to Africans “edifying, developing forces”. 
However, the editorial board could not promise the readers just ”when these good forces 
get the better of ignorance, war and other evil forces in Africa”.66 These and a host of 
other similar statements illustrate the whole atmosphere of bad Christian consciousness 
and the desire to repent and pay indulgence. This goodness syndrome was an important 
argument for development aid in general, as well as for ‘exporting Danish co-operative 
principles’, specifically. 
 The implicit thesis of a ‘white man’s burden’ was confirmed on a regular basis by 
 
62 M. Paldam, Dansk u-landshjælp. Altruismens politiske økonomi. Århus Universitetsforlag, Aarhus 
(1997). 
63 G.L.H. Svendsen,”Andelsbevægelsen og den hvide mands byrde. Et bidrag til en 
antropologisk-historisk belysning af dansk u-landsbistand 1960-70”. Historie, no. 2: 263-309 (2002). 
Easterly (2006a). 
64 Ab (1964), p. 512. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ab (1964), p. 1493. 
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the movement’s consultants employed in development projects abroad. They saw the 
co-operative principles as a means to escape primitiveness. Especially from 1964-1970 
these consultants and experts wrote articles rich on statements and headings like “The 
farmers of Guiana mix milk with water from the rivers”, “The agricultural consultants 
have to teach the Africans better methods of cultivation”, “Development aid to the 
underdeveloped countries creates a new way of thinking”, “The need for propagating 
the co-operative principles is enormous in Gambia”, “A reorganisation of the co-
operative movement in Tanzania would give members considerable economic gains”, 
etc.67 In this context, the term ‘co-operative upbringing’ was often applied, both within 
the Danish co-operative movement and in the ICA.68 
 On several occasions, the white man’s burden was confirmed by the 
underdeveloped peoples themselves, but only by the most ’modernistic’ thinking among 
them, typically young men with university education visiting Denmark to participate in 
seminars on the issue arranged by the co-operative movement.69 Thus, in their eagerness 
to partake in The Development several of these people described their own peoples as 
’primitive’ or ’backwards’, for example the school leader in Holsteinsborg, Greenland – 
which along with the Faroe Islands was recognized as an underdeveloped country at that 
time, albeit an underdeveloped one the Danish co-operative movement wanted to help 
before all others.70 
 Thus, during the 1960s the ideology of goodness combined with one of a global 
development race were conflated and reflected in large scale development aid. This is 
very similar to what happened in Norway where “realist arguments” gradually lost 
ground to “aid rhetoric” after World War II.71 Overall, it is surprising to see the lack of 
clear and sound arguments for development aid in the Western European countries, 
including important donor countries such as the UK72  and France.73 And astonishingly, 
such countries have since the 1950s continued to donate resources to regions unknown 
to the vast majority of Europeans – in the same ‘allochronic’ and a-personal way as 
always, voluntarily and without even being able to account for the precise effects. 
 As we have argued, in Denmark this happened due to Christian-European 
evolutionary ideology (monogenesis) aided by strong discoursive effects. Where might 
such effects be traced to in actual practice during the 1960s? Danish employees in 
national and international organisations put pressure on the government, indicating that 
Denmark was lagging behind in a rather distinguished – and distinguishing – global 
development aid race among the rich countries. “Denmark donates 0.16 percent of its 
GNP to development aid”, lamented Kjeld B. Juul in 1964, “while in the United States 
it has been decided to aim at granting one percent of GNP”.74 In sum, also here the laws 
of development seemed to govern the debate, reflected in statements like “there is a 
necessity of” and “it is necessary” [to grant more money]. 
 In the 1960s, the pro-agitators successfully convinced politicians to increase total 
Danish development aid to one percent of GNP as suggested by the UN – even though 
 
67 Ab (1965), p. 1506; Ab (1966), p. 295; Ab (1969), pp. 97, 187; Ab (1970), p. 807. 
68 E.g. Ab (1962), p. 969; Ab (1965), p. 1143; Ab (1966), pp. 296-97. About ICA: Ab (1965), pp. 258, 
1186. 
69 Ab (1970), p. 1065; Ab (1963), pp. 451ff., 1011ff. 
70 Ab (1964), p. 1043. See also Ab (1963), pp. 451ff.; Ab (1966), p. 129. 
71 H. Pharo, “Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil: Norway’s Foreign Economic Assistance Policy, 
1958-1971”. Contemporary European History, vol. 12, no. 4: 527-546 (2003), p. 546. 
72 Tomlinson, ”The Commonwealth, the Balance of Payments and the Politics of International Poverty: 
British Aid Policy, 1958-1971”, Contemporary European History, vol 12, no. 4: 431-456 (2003). 
73 Bossuat, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press (2003). 
74 Ab (1964), pp. 687-88. 
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some development aid enthusiasts had demanded a minimum of 3-4 percent (that is, just 
for starters, in phase one!). Moreover, leaders, consultants and experts within the co-
operative movement convinced ordinary members that the Danish co-operative 
movement should take the lead in regards to technical assistance – which they certainly 
did. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This contribution was able to trace back the new development terminology of rural 
Denmark after 1945 to nineteenth century evolutionist and physiocratic thinking. Our 
literature was Danish agricultural journals of the 1960s and we used the discourse 
analysis method. The value of this study is that based on concrete evidence in the form 
of contemporary journals, our analysis revealed how ideology, a new ‘aid speak’, paved 
the way for concrete policy proposals with regard to Danish development aid after 
1945. We further claimed that Danish development aid illustrated the Samaritan’s 
Dilemma because the ‘goodness’ ideology necessarily contains the perception of some 
people as primitive and helpless. The paradox is that in this game, it may be 
advantageous for the recipient to stay helpless. Donor motives seem to be based almost 
solely on the dominant strategy of being good. Recipients are thereby encouraged to 
exploit the situation when a donor is willing to help. The specific case of Danish 
development aid during the 1960s appears to confirm Buchanan’s Samaritan’s Dilemma 
hypothesis. 
 Using a historical-anthropological approach, we showed that technical 
development assistance within the famous Danish agriculturalist, co-operative 
movement was linked to an evolutionist ideology of developed and backward 
populations. Together with a strong altruistic Christian moral incentive to help – rooted 
in nineteenth century monogenesis evolutionist thought – otherwise conservative 
farmers were convinced of the necessity to help the underdeveloped peoples. The 
impact of the post-war development aid discourse clearly involved an ‘ideology of 
goodness’ in Denmark and, ultimately, a Samaritan’s Dilemma – which was also the 
case in many other Western European countries during that period. This ideology has 
laid the foundation for development aid in its present form and should, preferably, be 
changed if the desired goal of a more equal relationship between the nations of the 
world is to be achieved. 
